Atheism and Theory of Justification – Knowledge and Justification

Dictionaries, dictionaries of philosophy, pundits, theocrats and more have definitions of the term “atheist.” More often than not, these definitions are couched in ignorance. Dictionaries, the function of which is to report on societie’s use of terms, more often than not fail to represent an atheist definition of “atheist.” This is of course stupid, because there are few in society better to generate a descriptor of identity than the people of a given identity.

There may be more Muslims in the world than Christians, but you wouldn’t expect a decent dictionary to posit an exclusively Muslim perspective on the terms “Christian” or “Christianity” would you? Most likely not, unless perhaps you have an axe to grind with Christianity.

Pundits, particularly of the (conservative) theist persuasion have a long track record of dealing with the term atheist in ill faith. Indeed this is true of a number of Popes as well. “Why do they hate God?” is a re-occurring meme oh so indicative of the ignorance and often ill faith that the term “atheist” is constructed with. How can one hate something that they don’t think exists?

Given the popular misconceptions (and outright lies) about atheism, while not morally a responsibility upon the atheist (we aren’t responsible for the ignorance of others), it is our best interest to publicly voice what it is to be and why we are atheist. It is also in our best interest to voice the diversity of atheism; the differing roads to and reasons for as a bulwark against the outgroup homogenity bias that we are naturally subject to.

Often the first step in one’s atheism stems from epistemology, whether known by the atheist or not. Indeed, there is research that (predictably) demonstrates that epistemology influences a person’s beliefs (see work by the likes of Deanna Kuhn of the Epistemological Levels research programme), hence I view theory of justification as integral to the formation of atheist identity.

Show me a child that is born knowing a theory of God and I will show you a lie. It is that at some point, the naturally agnostic-atheist child comes across a concept of God and at some level, considers the truth of the concept in line with their epistemology. This is where the theory of justification comes in, and the forms of atheism hit a fork in the road.

At this point I’ll introduce you to some hypothetical characters who go down different forks in the road; Theo the theocrat (strong theist), Michelle the moderate (weak theist), Agnes the agnostic, Walter the weak atheist and Stew the strong atheist. These characters are archetypes designed to demonstrate substantive differences, but not all differences. Commonplace experience undoubtedly proves even more complex and a diversity of individual views much wider.

I will also admit that these distinctions, taken out of the spirit and context in which they are made are problematic. As an atheist, I’m not and can not be 100% sure in my portrayal of the specific views of theists; one has to be a theist to do that. My point is to make a distinction between atheists and theists, if only of degree.

Moreover, depending on the specific God claim, one can be a strong atheist where with other claims they are a weak atheist. I am an atheist by default (to borrow from Dawkins) in that I am generally a weak atheist. If one were however to posit that God is real and is a milkshake sitting by my computer then I’d be a strong atheist in regard to that claim; I can test the claim and demonstrate that there is indeed no milkshake next to my computer so “milkshake God” isn’t real.

The epistemological (gnostic-agnostic) and theistic axis that I have chosen however, are commonly used and moreover I beleive are well suited to the purpose I have in mind; addressing common misconceptions (and lies) about atheism. So I will continue with their use.

The five archetypes I have mentioned have reached a point in their lives where they first come into contact with their first God hypothesis. Lets say that their parents have taken them to the local mall on a Saturday and a proselytising theist decides to tell them a tale of an unfalsifiable God (any unfalsifiable God will do). The five kids, react in different ways, for the sake of argument we will assume their epistemology is something they have been inculcated into by their parents.

Theo gets a bit excited; he’s heard his parents talk of this God thing especially on Sundays but he’s never been told the details so he’s all ears and waiting for his membership card. It’s the truth!

Michelle is quite open minded and if there is no good reason why this Flying Spaghetti Monster isn’t true, she’ll give it some thought and probably give it a try. She does know however that she can’t prove the existence of the FSM either.

Agnes doesn’t know what to think, so she doesn’t draw a conclusion at all. She’s just waiting for her Dad to make his mind up about where to buy some clothes, and she’s not even sure she cares about that.

Walter isn’t convinced about this theory he is having peddled to him, so he chooses not to believe it, just like he chose not to believe the claims of the guy trying to peddle health tonics by the entrance.

Stew balks, doesn’t listen to the proselytist’s claims and laughs at the guy saying “I know that can’t be true! My Daddy says you are a wingnut! All wingnuts peddle silly ideas!”

Epistemologically speaking, both Stew and Theo are gnostic; they claim to know their conclusions and this is allowed by their own personal theories of justification. Stew recognises the authority of the claimant, doesn’t view it as a logical fallacy and hence bases his belief upon this. Similarly, Stew, a strong atheist in this case (and presumably in all cases) also accepts authority as a sound basis for a knowledge claim; his own personal theory of justification allowing it.

The claims could have been based on other types of arguments; Stew could have simply balked on the basis of a kind of logical positivism where the un-testability of the God theory rendered it invalid (rather than unknown). Stew or Theo could have used an array of logical fallacies to support their argument. The point is that the two allow themselves a positive knowledge claim as to the status of the theory.

Michelle and Walter also have similarities. Neither of them make a positive knowledge claim; they aren’t believers. While Theo claims to believe there is a God (according to the theory), Michelle doesn’t believe in no God. While Stew believes in no God, Walter has no belief in God. Perhaps Michelle can’t explain the universe without a God, hence she can’t justify a theory where there is no God, even if she can’t justify a particular God hypothesis. Walter on the other hand is purely skeptical; even if he can’t explain the Universe, he hasn’t seen evidence that his theory of justification would allow him to believe that a God hypothesis explains the Universe.

Agnes on the other hand, can’t justify the theory, so she has no belief or no disbelief.

Like myself, Walter thus-far has been a weak atheist from birth and continues to be one. They have all been weak atheists from birth; one can have an absence of belief in a theory that they have never been exposed to, but one can’t be indifferent toward, or have beliefs in relation to a theory that they have never encountered.

This isn’t to say that these positions are static. They aren’t. Walter may find a God hypothesis he can justify, or Theo may have a change in epistemology or simply find authority in another claimant (as may Stew). Agnes may get off the fence while Michelle may find God unnecessary to explain the Universe and default to weak atheism.

In short, their learning will inform their believing and that’s what I’ll discuss in the next part of this series of blogs.

~ Bruce